In his influential and provocative article on -What ISIS Really Wants‖, published in The Atlantic 
INTRODUCTION
It is just over a year-and-a half since the publication of Graeme Wood's controversial Atlantic cover article -What ISIS Really Wants‖.
1 A lot has happened in the interim in Syria and Iraq.
Palmyra, 2 Tikrit 3 and Ramadi 4 are no longer under ISIS control. After a year of sustained aerial bombardment 5 by U.S., 6 French 7 and Russian 8 warplanes, Raqqa, the so-called -stronghold‖ of the Islamic State, isn't looking so strong, still less anything remotely like the beatific utopia 9 depicted in ISIS propaganda. In recent months, the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition has reportedly killed more than 10,000 ISIS fighters, 10 including key figures among ISIS's leadership, most notably Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli, according to the Pentagon. 11 In addition to this, the group's Twitter footprint 12 has decreased markedly, 13 and all those earnest think-pieces about how to -counter-message‖ ISIS 14 no longer seem so urgent now that group doesn't look so prepotent in the offline, real world. argued, 18 any course of action will be promoted to the degree that it can be legitimized, it follows that ideological principles and their rhetorical recrafting by -innovating ideologists‖ (this is
Skinner's expression) must feature in the architecture of any comprehensive explanation of the course of action in question. This sheds a new light on the debate over the relationship between jihadist violence and Islam. Instead of arguing that the former is driven by the latter or insisting that the latter has nothing to do with the former, the argument in what follows is that revolutionary Islamic doctrines provide legitimizing scripts for jihadist violence. Even if this violence, as seems obvious, has deeper social, psychological and political roots, and even if the scripts are not sincerely held by those who claim adherence to them, the ideological legitimation of jihadist violence is a crucial causal condition of its occurrence.
The article is divided into three main parts. The first part summarizes Wood's argument and the criticisms mounted against it. The second part argues that Skinner's core insight that ideals or principles are both -constraining and enabling‖ helps clarify existing misconceptions over ISIS and its causal connection to Islam. The third part explores the highly charged question of whether Islamic scripture is especially susceptible to demagogic manipulation by innovating jihadist ideologists. Wood's article was 10,500 words long, and its tone was sober and scholarly. Despite this, it went viral. According to the web analytics company Chartbeat, 23 it was the best read digital article of 2015, receiving a total of 100 million minutes of engaged reading time. In the months following its online publication it attracted approximately 10,000 views a day. On the night of the November 2015 Paris attacks it received an extraordinary 1.9 million views.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 6 The article, in part, served a polemical purpose and was an attempt to refute the view, prevalent in Washington political circles in mid-2014, that ISIS was just a bunch of thugs and psychopaths who posed no serious strategic threat to the Middle East or the wider world. 24 But it was also a serious attempt to explain the nature of the group, its origins, aims and broader ideological vi- ISIS has become notorious for its terrible brutality and violence. Since its dramatic rise to prominence in the summer of 2014, the group has slaughtered thousands of defenseless Iraqi soldiers and Shiite civilians, gunning them into trenches. 36 It has raped and enslaved hundreds of women. 37 It has brutalized children by forcing them to watch scenes of horrific cruelty. 38 It has presided over public crucifixions in Raqqa. 39 It has coerced boys as young as 14 to carry out suicide missions. 40 It has launched a campaign of murderous aggression against gay men. 41 It has stolen and destroyed ancient and irreplaceable artifacts. 42 And it has created a vast library of atrocity porn that degrades not only the helpless victims who appear in it but also those who watch it. 43 To say that all this inhumanity and carnage is strongly rooted in, or somehow connected to, Islam runs counter to the one of the prevailing mantras of polite modern political gious doctrines and beliefs play in terrorism? Is religion a force for good in the world or a source of evil? ISIS, because of the vigor and fastidiousness with which it has sought to justify its actions as divinely mandated, has brought these wider questions to the fore.
Hasan's view that religion -religion here being a euphemism for Islam --plays little, if any, role in the radicalisation process‖ has gathered considerable traction since Wood's article was published last year. Writing after the Brussels attacks in March, The Washington Post's Ishaan
Tharoor argued that -radicalization is driven less by religious fervor than by more local factors, and it is shaped also by ties to gangs and other criminal activity‖.
For this view, Tharoor leaned
on Rik Coolsaet's recent study of the jihadist scene in Belgium, according to which -the root causes of radicalization‖ are -high unemployment, marginalization, discrimination and a sense of alienation from the wider society‖. dealing with what are best described as ‗Islamized radicals'.‖ 55 The idea that western recruits to ISIS were, as Grignard puts it, -radical before they were religious‖ 56 also finds support in the thinking of Olivier Roy. European jihadists, he observes, have Muslim backgrounds, but they are not religious, and none has a past of piety. Rather, their route into jihadism is via a broader disaffection from the societies into which they were integrated. Jihadism gives them -a cause, a label, a grand narrative to which they can add the bloody signature of their personal revolt‖, in the way extremist leftwing ideologies did for some in the 1960s and 1970s.
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LEGITIMATION AND CAUSALITY
In England in the Age of the American Revolution, published in 1930, the British historian Sir
Lewis Namier warned about public figures who summon high moral principles to explain their own actions, and insisted that such professed ideals will be ex post facto rationalizations that have little or nothing to do with their actual motives for acting. 58 Indeed, for Namier, like the Marxist historians he claimed to despise, the ideals invoked by politicians were mere epiphenomena, deployed to conceal intentions of a very different and often inadmissible kind. Namier and his followers were castigated by less hard-headed historians for their cynicism. Hebert But- In this view, the will to power, not ideology, is the cause of ISIS's violence.
On the other side of this argument are those who insist that there is direct relationship be-tween belief and action, and that the former inexorably drives the latter. -Believe,‖ the atheist philoso- Both sides in this debate make some valid points. But they are also deficient in numerous respects. It is of course entirely plausible that some jihadists are motivated by a sincere religious commitment, as they subjectively see it, and that their actions are directly premised on this commitment. In fact, there is some empirical evidence to show this. 65 But, equally, it is also entirely plausible that others became jihadists not out of a religious commitment and were not remotely religious at the time at which they became involved in jihadist activism. There is some evidence, also, for this alternative scenario. Coolsaet, for example, in the study cited by Tharoor, found that many Belgium jihadists in were not particularly religious or engaged politically. -Religion is not of the essence,‖ he concluded. 66 The release, earlier this year, of leaked ISIS recruitment forms would appear to support this view. In a preliminary assessment of the forms, West Point's Combating Terrorism Center found that 70% of 4,173 foreign recruits considered themselves novices about Shariah law, 67 although, as Andrew Lebovich has commented, this doesn't conclusively show that they were not religious at the time at which they joined ISIS. But is doesn't not follow from this that religion doesn't feature as a motive, among others, in jihadist violence. 73 Skinner's explanation for this is that people have a strong motive for trying to legitimize any conduct liable to appear suspect, and to the degree that cannot find a legitimatory warrant for their behavior they will be inhibited from pursuing it. 78 Furthermore, in claiming that their conduct was in fact motivated by some accepted principle they must behave, in Skinner is a moral, cultural and intellectual resource on which people draw and which they use for a variety of private and public purposes. It provides the guiding scripts and rituals for a whole range of social activities. 94 . But it is equally important to recognize that just as religion enables, it also constrains in significant ways, liming the scope of that which is permissible and hence possible. I have sometimes been tempted to think of a religious heritage as a set of circuits that the politically inclined may or may not choose to switch on or as a menu from which they may or may not choose to make a selection; that is to say, an ancient religion, like a menu, provides its modern adherents with a set of options that do not determine their choices but do constrain them.
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In a footnote to this, Cook added, by way of qualification, that -even this may exaggerate the degree of freedom of choice. Often one should perhaps think rather of a menu dispensed by a waiter anxious to sell the house specials‖. 256 reads: -There is no compulsion in religion: true guidance has become distinct from error, so whoever rejects false gods and believes in God has grasped the firmest hand-hold, one that will never break.‖ 103 ) Although it is a stretch to read it in this way, especially given how condemnatory and threatening the Quran is toward unrepentant disbelievers, a case can be made for it. By contrast, it is far more difficult to find in the Quran, still less the hadith (the collected sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), a warrant for same-sex marriage. But it is not especially difficult to find within its pages a doctrine of religious martyrdom, and although, as Bernard Lewis has sagely observed, 104 it is a dangerous interpretive liberty to extend this to suicide bombing given how potently suicide is forbidden in Islam, the case for it is not wholly without foundation and in fact enjoys some moral and cultural plausibility among not a few Muslims. 105 According to As- 
CONCLUSION
The whole debate over the religious character of ISIS has become polarized between those who insist that it has everything to do with Islam and those who insist that it has little or nothing to do with it. In fact, it has become a proxy debate for a much wider debate about the role and nature of Islam and its relationship to the secular west. This is why the response to Wood's article generated so much more heat than light. It is also why so much scholarly discourse on jihadist terrorism is morally gamed toward minimizing the role of religious ideology. Scholars, who for the most part are liberal-leftist in outlook, don't want to denigrate Islam, so they relocate the causal it is a key element in any causal explanation of its occurrence, and any account that marginalizes or denies this role is unlikely to be particularly helpful in illuminating the conditions that enable people to kill for self-proclaimedly religious purposes.
The practical implication that flows from this is that ideas are causally important and that ideas which promote violence against innocents must be vigorously repudiated and denied legitimacy.
They must also be countered by better, more compelling, ideas. One of the most urgent policy questions is working out exactly what these ideas are and how to rhetorically frame and disseminate them. This task is made all the more difficult in an ironic, post-modern age that is innately 
